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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The issue of free trade is presently very important, both in Canada and
the United States. As a Canadian attending school in the U.S., I have
taken an interest in the outcome of the free trade negotiations, and in
particular, the controversy over Canadian lumber exports to the United
States. Having lived in an area of Canada where the lumber industry is
an Important part of the economy, I can understand the Canadian views
on the lumber issue. Having also lived in Montana where the lumber
industry plays the same Important role in the economy, I can
understand the American views on the lumber issue as well.
Although the lumber issue is a primary concern, the overall issue
between Canada and the United States is free trade. Free trade occurs
when two countries agree, by binding treaty, not to use t a r iff or
nontariff devices to protect their respective domestic industries. At
the present time, the governments of Canada and the United States are
preparing for discussions on free trade between the two nations.
Several preliminary meetings have been held and both sides hope to.
reach an agreement by the fa ll of 1987. The reason for the time
lim ita tio n is that the U.S. Congress has only given President Reagan
until the fir s t of 1988 to reach a free trade agreement w ith Canada,
and Congress requires six weeks to decide on any agreement reached
between the two sides. Thus the fa ll 1986 deadline.
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Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the paper w ill examine the
politics behind setting up a free trade agreement and the d iffic u ltie s
that the Canadian and U.S. governments face in doing so. Second, the
paper w ill examine the economic effects of a free trade agreement on
North America’s lumber industry and the politica l implications on
Canada and the United States,
In examining these two issues, the paper w ill address questions
regarding the guarantees required by each country before each agrees
to negotiate a free trade package, the effects of free trade on the
lumber industry (both large and small firm s) in both countries, and the
impact that a free trade agreement between Canada and the United
States could have on America's other trading partners.

Definition of Terms
Countervailing Duties
A countervailing duty is a monetary penalty placed on an import
product that has been determined to be unfairly subsidized and
therefore Injuring sim ila r domestic products.
GATT (General Agreements on T a riffs and Trade)
The principal global arrangement for trade liberalization. Although
generally designed as a temporary agreement, GATT evolved into a
permanent and important institution. It became effective In 1948
w ith 19 countries as members. Its membership has since expanded to
include almost all of the important noncommunist nations and several
socialist countries of Eastern Europe (Robock and Simmonds, 1983).
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The primary reason for GATT's existence Is to provide a framework for
multinational trade negotiations. GATT also has a number of prin
ciples that help further trade expansion, One of the principles Is
nondiscrimination. A t a r iff that is granted must be granted to all
GATT members under the most-favored-natlon clause of the agree
ment. Therefore, no country can give trade preference to another
without giving It to all members of GATT,
Another GATT principle Is the concept of consultation. When trade
disagreements occur, GATT provides a forum fo r consultation. Here
the two sides in the dispute are more likely to reach a compromise
than to resort to arbitrary trade-restricting actions. World trade
cooperation since World War Two has led to a more open-door trading
policy. GATT has played a major role in this e ffo rt (Terpstra, 1972,
1978, 1983).
Stumpage
Stumpage Is the monetary value of standing timber, or more narrowly,
the cost to remove the timber. The residual value method of calculat
ing stumpage arrives at prices by subtracting from the end product
value all relevant costs of production and transportation, as w ell as an
allowance for p ro fit and risk.
In Canada, private firm s are awarded 15-25 year tenure agreements
and cutting licenses on a fir s t come, fir s t served basis. Firms pay the
appraised price but are also responsible for planning, managing and
replanting the forest and other associated costs, Including road
building and fire protection. As w ell, stumpage prices change every
month in accordance w ith the market. The provincial governments net
most of their gain or loss from these fluctuations.
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In the United States, the appraisal constitutes a base from which to
launch competitive bidding fo r forest cutting rights, sometimes up to
five years in advance. The management cost is added to the appraisal
before bids are let, and the U.S. Forest Service carries out the work.
Prices are set on the day of sale and do not change over the life of the
contract, usually three to five years (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey,
1986).

Justification of the Paper
Free trade between Canada and the United States is not only important
to the two nations, but to the rest of the world as well. Most
countries follow a practice of subsidizing or protecting major
industries which are of v ita l Importance, be it in terms of national
security, economy or pride. What Canada and the United States are
discussing is eliminating subsidies and protectionism. Such an agree
ment w ill have a profound effect on businesses In both countries
which is the primary reason why it has become so d iffic u lt for the two
sides to s it down and to come to an agreement on a free trade
package.
Free trade between the two nations is also significant on other
grounds. Some Canadians are fearful that their country may be
annexed by the United States. They feel that free trade w ill open up
the border between the two countries to such an extent that only one
country w ill emerge. As w ell, other countries are taking an interest
in the Canada-US talks. If free trade is achieved between Canada and
the United States, such countries as Japan, Britain and West Germany
may also seek to negotiate sim ila r trade agreements w ith the United
States, These issues must be considered when discussing the
Canada-US free trade issue.
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The US lumber Industry has stated that it Is being hurt by Canadian
lumber imports. It accuses the Canadian government (both Federal and
Provincial) of subsidizing its lumber industry. Canadian producers, on
the other hand, assert that they are simply more e fficie n t than U.S.
producers and that the high value of the U.S. dollar makes Canadian
lumber cheaper. Obviously, the Reagan Adm inistration believes
Canadian lumber is being subsidized, as it recently moved to impose a
15 percent import duty on Canadian softwood products entering the
United States. The possibility of Canada subsidizing its lumber
industry versus the possibility that the Canadian industry Is more
efficient, needs to be examined further as no free trade agreement
could be signed if Canada were protecting its lumber industry.

Research Methods
This paper is based on a content analysis of secondary sources from
the Federal and Provincial governments of Canada and the Federal and
State governments of the United States. In addition, editorials and
articles on the issue of free trade and how it w ill affect the lumber
industry w ill be examined in this research paper.

Contributions of the Paper
This paper w ill be of benefit to individuals interested in the free trade
talks between Canada and the United States, especially those involved
in the lumber industry. The paper w ill also provide insight regarding
the free trade issue using the views of government o ffic ia ls on both
sides of the border. As w ell, the views of leading c ritic s and
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proponents of the talks from both countries are presented This paper
w ill also provide an understanding of what the two nations are hoping
to achieve from a free trade agreement and what types of pressure are
being placed on the governments In each country.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADA-US
LUMBER TRADE RELATIONSHIP

Background
The recent proposal to place import ta riffs on Canadian lumber Is not
the fir s t time restrictions have been placed on cross-border trade of
lumber products. T a riffs were In effect until 1913 when the U.S.
realized the need for Canadian wood In order to Increase the pace of
urbanization of American citie s (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
During the depression, the United States refused to allow lumber
Imports, but In 1935 the restrictions were removed as domestic
lumber prices rose significantly.
In the 1960’s and early 1970*s, Presidents Johnson and Nixon appealed
to Canada to Increase their export production to meet U.S. demand and
to keep prices low In the U.S. housing m arket Figure 1 shows the
Increase In softwood lumber production In Canada and the U.S, between
1975 and 1985.
American leaders acknowledged that the U.S. could not be s e lfsu fficien t in lumber production during periods of stable growth and
looked to Canada as a secure source of supply (Maly, DalSaglio, and
McKinsey, 1986). By the 1980’s, economic conditions In the United
States worsened and actions In favor of re strictin g Canadian Imports
began.
In the late I970*s, Canada Increased its market share of lumber
consumption in the United States. A primary cause fo r the increase
was the use of new technology In Canadian m ills. The Canadian
Industry also began harvesting smaller trees which gave them an
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FIGURE 1
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increased supply of lumber. Another important factor in Canada's
increased U.S. market share was the decreased value of the Canadian
dollar. In 1976, exchange rates reversed and the value of the U.S.
dollar moved above parity w ith the Canadian dollar, where it s t ill
remains today even in terms of real exchange rates. Figure 2 presents
exchange rates for 1979-1984.
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Q U A R TE R LY IN D E X O F REA L E X C H A N G E RATES
C A N A D IA N DO LLAR P E R U .S . DO LLAR
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How A Countervailing Suit Is Processed
At this time, it is relevant to discuss how a countervailing su it is
processed. Both Canada and the United States are members of GATT,
General Agreement on T a riffs and Trade, and therefore have sim ila r
trade laws in regard to imposing countervailing duties. In the United
States, any concerned party (individual, group, or business firm ) may
file a petition requesting countervailing duties to be placed on
subsidized imported goods. It should be noted, however, that such
duties are illegal under the GATT agreement. The petition is then
moved to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) who determine
whether there is a material injury caused by imports on domestic
products. If no material injury is found, then the case is dropped, If,
however, the Commission finds that the Import product is causing
material injury, the case is turned over to the International Trade
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Administration (ITA), part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, who
determine If foreign subsidies exist. If ITA finds that subsidies do
exist, it moves to establish the amount of the countervailing duty to
be Imposed on the foreign goods.
There are a number of ways to stop the countervailing duties from
being imposed. The U.S. President has the power to decide not to
impose the duties. Also, the decisions of the ITC and ITA may be
contested in the U.S. Court of International Trade. Rarely 1s this step
taken but a reversal of a decision could have an Immense impact on the
future interpretation of U.S. trade law by the ITC and ITA. The Court of
International Trade's rulings are subject to review and possible
reversal In a Court of Appeals; otherwise the administrative agencies
are obliged to abide by court decisions (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey,
1986).

RULINGS ON CANADIAN LUMBER IMPORTS TO THE U.S.
In December 1981, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee and the U.S.
House Ways and Means Committee petitioned the U.S. ITC to conduct a
study comparing the Canadian and American lumber Industries and the
effect of Canadian softwood lumber Imports on the U.S. Industry. In
April 1982, the ITC issued its report. The report found that Canadian
softwood lumber imports caused a material injury to U.S. lumber
producers. In October of the same year, the United States Coalition for
Fair Canadian Lumber Imports submitted a petition to the ITA calling
for countervailing duties on Canadian lumber (Maly, DalSaglio, and
McKinsey, 1986). The petition accused the Canadian governments of
directly and indirectly subsidizing their lumber products industry. It
stated that the subsidies enjoyed by Canadian lumber firm s was
causing U.S. competitors to be Injured. Canadian stumpage prices was
the main Issue of the allegations made by the Coalitllon.
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In November of 1982, the Canadian Softwood Lumber Committee was
formed to represent the Canadian lumber industry at the ITA hearings.
The fir s t move of the Committee was to prepare a brief denouncing the
charges and stipulating that the decline of the U.S. softwood Industry
was caused by a combination of economic factors affecting both
countries, and that speculative overbidding and declining value of the
Canadian dollar were more correct causes of Increased market share
than alleged subsidies (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
By March 1983, the ITA had returned w ith its preliminary findings. It
stated that the subsidies being provided to Canadian producers and
exporters of softwood lumber were below the minimum level, 0.5
percent of the value of the product, needed to class the subsidies as
significant. The ITA also stated that Canadian stumpage fees should
not be considered a subsidy, as they were not being used to assist a
specific industry or company and were not export oriented. The U.S.
Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports challenged the IT As
findings In the U.S. Court of International Trade. The appeal was
denied and the ITA's final decisions were handed down In May 1983.
In March 1985, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and his Special Trade
Representative requested the ITC to do an updated Investigation of the
U.S. and Canadian lumber industries. This action was undoubtedly
triggered by members of Congress, especially those from the
Northwest of the U.S., who continued to make allegations of unfair
trade practices by the Canadian government. Domestic complaints
centered around the disparity between record consumption levels in
1984 and only marginal Improvements In employment and p ro fita b ility
among U.S. firm s (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Senator Bob
Packwood, committee chairman of the special Senate session on
Canadian lumber said, It Is tim e for the Canadian government to
recognize the consequences of Its softwood lumber pricing practices.
Canada must come to terms w ith the severe dislocations experienced
by the American Industry and the reaction which that has produced.
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The ITC released the findings of the updated report in October 1985. It
found that Canadian lumber firm s pay only one-tenth of what U.S.
firm s must pay for timber. Senator Bob Packwood then requested
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter to enter Into high-level negotiations w ith
the Canadian government on the timber pricing problem (Senator Max
Baucus' Office). The negotiations failed to come up w ith a solution and
in May 1986, the U.S. government imposed a 35 percent ta r iff on
Canadian cedar shingles.
The Canadian government tried to avoid a sim ila r ruling on Canadian
softwood imports to the United States. Canadian Trade Minister Pat
Carney offered to raise stumpage prices of Canadian Crown lumber by
12 percent. Carney hoped this would change the minds of U.S. lumber
producers and end the cross-border dispute over softwood lumber.
Carney said that Canada had made a once only" o ffer to voluntarily
raise the price of lumber exported to the United States. The U.S.
producers refused the offer.
On October 16. 1986, the U.S. Commerce Department reversed their
1983 finding that Canadian lumber pricing practices did not constitute
a subsidy CAP, October 17, 1986). The Reagan Administration then
moved to Impose a 15 percent duty on Canadian softwood lumber
imports to offset what It claimed were Illegal subsidies by Canadian
provincial governments. This was only the preliminary ruling. The
final decision w ill be presented on December 30, 1986 and the
Canadian government can then decide whether to appeal the decision.

The Prevalent Economic Conditions of the Canada-U.S. Lumber
iM ü s tr lêJs. 1970 to the Present

In a sense. North America could be considered one large forest. Com
bined, Canada and the United States have almost a billion acres of
productive forestland. Canada has 490 m illion acres of productive
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forestland while the United States has 483 m illion acres of productive
forestland. Figures 3 and 4 show productive forestland In Canada and
the U.S.
FIGURE 3
O W N E R S H IP O F P R O D U C T IV E
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FIGURE 4
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Canada and the United States have the second and third largest
productive forest resources, while the U.5.5.R. has the largest
available resources. Future estimates have shown that the big threethe U.S.A., Canada and the U.S.S R .-w Ill produce approximately
tw o-thirds of the world's supply of forest products In 1990 w hile at
the same time consuming 64 percent of the world's total demand.
(Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
During the mid to late 1970's, the lumber Industries of Canada and the
United States attained high levels of activity. Then a ctivity dropped
during the world recession of 1981-82. However, by 1986 the two
nations lumber Industries had recovered. U.S. production levels rose
from the 1982 low of 25.1 b illion board feet to 32.8 billion board feet,
while Canadian production Increased nearly one-third over 1982 levels
to 20.1 billion board feet in 1983 and 20.6 b illion board feet in 1984.
(Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Housing starts are also another
Indicator of how well the lumber Industry is doing. Figure 5 shows a
comparison of 1975 and 1984 housing starts In Canada and the U.S.
FIGURE 5
U .S . A N D

C A N A D IA N
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STARTS
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197tt
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The U.S. lumber industry basically exists to serve a domestic market.
Only a very small portion of U.S. production is exported. The Canadian
lumber industry is much different. It sells only about one-quarter of
its production for domestic use and exports the remainder. About 67
percent of all Canadian lumber exports goes to the United States, as
shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
MARKETS FOR U.S. AND CANADIAN
LUMBER PRODUCTION
1M» (0 MOMTHS)

U.S. Production

Conodlon Production

The ten year period between 1976 and 1985 saw the amount of U.S.
lumber exports decrease while imports into the U.S. increased. Total
U.S. softwood exports declined from a high of 1.9 b illion board feet in
1960 to 1.6 billion board feet in 1984 while total imports have
steadily risen from 22 percent of the U.S. market share in 1976 to 31
percent of the market share in 1984. (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey,
1986). By 1985, Canadian softwood imports into the United States
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reached 148 b illion board feet, up almost threefold from 1975. Figure
7 shows softwood lumber imports from Canada fo r 1975 and 1985,
FIGURE 7
S O F T W O O D L U M B E R IM P O R T S
FROM CANADA

##
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For over 50 years Canada has been a dependable supplier of softwood
lumber to the United States. Softwood lumber is one of the most
Important single items of trade between Canada and the United
States. In 1985 Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. were in excess of
Canadian $3.5 billion. Over 60 000 Canadian jobs are directly
dependent on those exports (Department of External A ffairs, Canada,
July 4, 1986). By placing a ta r iff on Canadian softwood lumber
Imports, it is obvious that the Canadian lumber industry w ill suffer
economically. On the other hand, the United States may be able to save
some of the economic downfall of its lumber industry by imposing this
action. Potlatch Corporation, which already had been forced to close
three lumber m ills in Idaho, announced the closure of a fourth in 1985.
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That m ill employed ju st over 200 \A/orkers (Coalition fo r Fair Lumber
imports, January 20, 1986). Between 1977 and 1984, the U.S.
government calculated that 30 000 jobs were lost in the lumber
industry, This s ta tis tic does not begin to show the real job loss in
the U.S. because of Canadian imports due to the ripple effect of such
losses in the economy.
Future of the Canada-US Lumber Industries
The Canadian forest industry is worried about reforestation. Part of
the money received for a harvested tree must be used for reforesta
tion. Since stumpage fees are uncommonly low in Canada, they find
themselves unable to generate the funding to reforest harvested
woodlands at a rate that would generate a future tim ber supply. A
spokesman for the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association recently
stated; Continuation of present levels of regeneration, stand improve
ment, and resource protection w ill precipitate a decline from current
levels of wood production. Consequently, members of the Canadian
lumber industry are concerned that the lack of expenditures on
regeneration and resource protection may have long-term implications
on the industry's competitiveness in the export market.
In the United States, the U.S. Forest Service predicts that long-term
demand for lumber products w ill increase during the next half century.
Imports are expected to rise, especially from Canada, fillin g part of
the domestic need. The balance of domestic need w ill be fille d by U.S.
lumber. Total projected softwood roundwood harvest rises from 9.6
b illion cubic feet in 1980 to 11.9 b illio n cubic feet in 2030. Projected
annual softwood tim ber harvests in the West remain close to the 1980
level of 2.3 billion cubic feet until 1990 and then decline slig h tly to
about 2.0 b illion cubic feet. The Southern subregions of softwood
timber harvests are projected to increase steadily from about 4.1
b illio n cubic feet in 1980 to 7.3 billion in 2030 (Maly, DalSaglio, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
McKlnsey, 1986), As w ell, prices are expected to change w ith
variances in supply and demand.
Chgptgr ..Summary
The history of lumber trade between Canada and the United States has
been long and sometimes rocky. In the 1960's and 70 s the American
government was almost begging fo r Canada to increase its lumber
exports to the U.S. to help meet domestic demand. By the 1980's, the
U.S. had had enough of Canadian lumber imports. The U.S. economy was
sagging and Canadian imports were causing U.S. lumbermills to shut
down and lumbermen to lose their jobs. A countervail action was
brought against the Canadian lumber industry in 1981, but by 1983, the
U.S. ITA had ruled against the petition. In 1985, the suit was reopened
and the recent preliminary findings (October 1986) have reversed the
earlier decision.
As far as competition goes, the U.S. lumber producers are not trying to
drive their Canadian competitors out of the U.S. market, What U.S.
lumber producers are seeking is an equal competitive position in order
to retain a fa ir market share at prices that result in an adequate
return on investment (Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, January 20,
1986).
Concerns have been raised over Canadian reforestation practices.
Canadians have been cutting younger trees and failing to reforest the
lands. Experts predict that a continuation of this policy could cause a
decline in future levels of wood production. This could hurt the
Canadian lumber industry as U.S. o ffic ia ls predict an increase in
demand for lumber over the next 50 years and imports are expected to
increase. If Canada's production declines due to lack of reforestation,
they w ill be unable to capitalize on the projected increase of demand
in the U.S. market.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NORTH AMERICAN LUMBER INDUSTRY
IN TERMS OF THE BROADER FREE TRADE QUESTION
Background
The Canadian lumber import controversy has interupted the Canada-US
discussions on a fu ll scale free trade agreement. On December 10,
1985, President Ronald Reagan form ally requested authority from the
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee to
begin negotiations. These Committees agreed to Mr. Reagan's request
and he may negotiate w ith Canada until the beginning of 1988.
However, some members of Congress and the Special Trade
Representative have said that broader discussions could not begin
until the lumber issue is cleared up (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey,
1986). On the other side of the border, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
of Canada addressed the House of Commons and told them of his plans
to proceed w ith free trade negotiations between Canada and the United
States. Because of the different political system in Canada (the
Parliamentary system), Mr. Mulroney was able to prepare for free trade
talks w ith only minimal discussion and delay.
Canada and the United States are currently preparing for talks on free
trade between the two nations, Over the past year, a number of
studies have been completed by the respective Federal governments to
ascertain the a d visib ility of more liberal trade relations. From these
studies, two basic recommendations have been set forth: ( l ) to
proceed w ith negotiations to establish a comprehensive Canada-United
States Free Trade Area; or (2) to take more liberal steps toward trade
enhancement, such as selective ta r iff reductions and removal of
certain nontariff barriers to increase trade flow s and improve market
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accessibility on both sides of the shared border (Maly, DalSaglio, and
McKinsey, 1986). The two governments are s t ill In the process of
discussing the trade issues.
Causes of the Delay in Free Trade Negotiations Between Canada
and the United States
Most Americans feel that Canada is unfairly subsidizing its lumber
industry. Representative Bonker stated that throughout the
Administration and the Congress there is now a widespread agreement
that the Canadian stumpage pricing system constitutes an unfair
subsidy, and that this practice must be terminated (NFPA, May, 1986).
Since the lumber issue appeared to be the stumbling block in the
negotiations, Canadian and U.S. trade o ffic ia ls held a number of
meetings to address the problem. As of yet, no consensus has been
reached. The focal point of the dispute stems around a report issued
by the U.S. ITC in October 1985 and a decision by the U.S. Commerce
Department in October 1986. Basically, the report was a re-evaluation
of an earlier report presented by the ITC in 1983. The subject of the
report was whether or not the Canadian government was
subsidizing its lumber industry. The 1983 report found that Canada
was not subsidizing its lumber industry, but the 1985 report and the
1986 U.S. Commerce Department decision overturned this ruling and
imposed a 15 percent import duty on Canadian softwood imports.
The Canadian government feels that their stumpage pricing practices
should not be an issue since in 1983 the International Trade
Commission set down a decision that exonerated Canadian lumber
exporters from U.S. industry charges that they were being subsidized
(Lewington, April 10, 1986). Some Canadians believe that the new
tough stance taken by the U.S. government w ill hurt trade talk
relations. Opinion polls show public support has been slipping rapidly
in Canada and the U.S. lumber duty may make it all that much harder

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
fo r Ottawa to continue w ith the talks, government sources said
(Blinch, October 21, 1986). Figure 8 shows the results of the poll.
FIGURE 8 SUPPORT FOR CANADA-US TRADE TALKS

Do you support the federal government’s position on negoti
ating a freer trade package with the government of the
United States?

YES
YES
YES

23%

16%

C a y* B v « t*n

However, a different view is held by American officials. The U.S.
decision to slap duties on Canadian lumber has worsened ties between
the two big trading partners, but in the end may prod them toward an
early agreement on bilateral free trade, U.S. o ffic ia ls say (Trautman,
October 18, 1986).
Wheat subsidies are another controversial issue which has been
deterring the trade talks from beginning. The U.S. Congress has
proposed legislation that would allow U.S. subsidized wheat to be sold
to the Soviet Union and China, two of Canadian wheat producer's best
customers. George Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State has called the
legislation ridiculous and harmful to relations w ith grain-exporting
allies such as Canada, although the U.S. Congress continues to pressure
the Reagan Administration to ignore foreign protests (Shepherd, 1986).
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Since wheat is one of Canada's major export products, this move by the
U.S. Congress has enraged a m ajority of Canadian wheat farmers and,
in turn, a m ajority of Canadian politicians who are putting pressure on
Prime Minister Mulroney to take retaliatory actions.
Besides the grain dispute, relations between Canada and the United
States have been strained over President Ronald Reagan's decision to
slap a 35 percent ta r iff on Canadian cedar shakes and shingles and
Canada's decision to retaliate w ith new and increased duties on items
such as Christmas trees, books and computer parts(ibid). Canada
Imposed a 10 percent ta r iff on American books and periodicals
published less than four times per year, a 3,9 percent ta r iff on
computer parts and a 5,4 percent ta r iff on certain semiconductor
devices. As w ell, other ta riffs w ill be applied against a variety of U.S.
imports into Canada, from oatmeal to diesel cars. The two nations
keep saying they want a free trade arrangement w ith each other, yet
they do everything in their power to place strains on the talks by
issuing new ta riffs or duties. As Canada's Prime Minister, Brian
Mulroney recently said. If you were a betting man right now, you'd have
to say there's going to be no deal-the Americans are going to shoot it
down.
Another major issue delaying the trade ta lks-a t least on the Canadian
side of the border-is the issue of sovereignty. The feeling is growing
in Canada that these talks pose a grave danger to our sovereignty.
Canadians are worried about becoming merely a trust te rrito ry of the
United States, said prominent nationalist Mel Hurtig, chairman of the
Council of Canadians. Some Canadians fear that the increased trade
caused by a free trade agreement w ill allow Americans to in filtra te
their very way of life. They fear that their cultural history and ties
w ith the Commonwealth w ill be destroyed. They fear annexation.
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However, Prime Minister Mulroney has pledged to protect the vague
concept of "cultural sovereignty’ In the trade negotiations. Mulroney
said the Canada Council, the CBC and the National Ballet are examples
of Institutions not up for negotiation (Blinch, 1986), Until this group
of Canadians is satisfied that Canada w ill not give up her sovereignty
In a free trade deal, they w ill continue to pressure the Canadian
government to stop trade negotiations w ith the United States.
Many of the d iffic u ltie s that have arisen in preparing for free trade
talks stem from the fact that Canada and the United States have
different political systems. The United States places an emphasis on
the private sector taking a prominent role in the country’s economy,
whereas In Canada the public sector (government) plays a prominent
role In the economy.
Presently, there Is pressure In the U S. Congress to formulate more
rather than less re strictive trade measures. At the present time,
there are over 300 pieces of legislation before Congress that would In
some way re s tric t Imports to the United States. Of these 300 bills,
there are at least a dozen that could affect Canada-US trade. The
primary reason fo r this pressure is the U.S. trade deficit. The United
States trade d e fic it w ith Canada soared last year to $22.2 billion U.S.,
second only to the nearly $50 b illion w ith Japan, Of the total, the
Canadian forestry products accounted for $4 billion (AP, August 4,
1966). By singling countries or Industries out, the U.S. Congress can
make an easier arguement that imports are hurting U.S. workers. The
Congress tends to focus on trade d eficits w ith specific countries and
certain Import categories because job losses and the transfer of
ownership of domestic Industries to foreign creditors are more
tangible problems (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). That Is why
the Canadian lumber Industry has been singled out as causing
unemployment In the U.S. lumber Industry.
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Trade negotiations between Canada and the United States cannot begin
until the problems stated here have been solved. As it stands now, it
seems unlikely that trade talks w ill be able to begin in time enough to
reach an agreement by the fa ll 1987 deadline.

Guarantees Required by Canada and the United States Before
Free Trade Talks Can Begin
Since January 1986, there have been a number of government to
government discussion sessions held between Canada and the United
States. The fir s t was in San Diego on January 20, a second in Prince
George B.C. February 12-14 and a third in Washington D C. on March 12.
These meetings were held to see how fa r apart the two sides actually
were from reaching an agreement. The lumber issue was the primary
concern of the meetings. Since that time, several more sessions have
been held, and in late August 1986, the Canadian bargaining team set
down a lis t of guarantees that would have to be agreed to before they
would be w illin g to s it down and discuss a free trade package w ith the
United States.

Specifically Canada wants four concessions from the U.S.:
( I ) Relief from protectionist measures, Including quotas, that lim it
foreign Imports into the United States, plus new rules lim itin g the use
of American trade remedies or penalties like countervailing duties
now being considered against softwood lumber, anti-dumping and other
special ta riffs like those imposed on cedar shakes and shingles.
(2) A reduction in remaining American ta riffs on Canadian goods.
(3) Access to buy American programs and other federal and state
government procurement policies that encourage American agencies to
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prefer American goods and services even when they are more
expensive than sim ila r foreign goods and services. And, (4) A
mechanism for settling future trade disputes that would head o ff the
use of harsh and sometimes arbitrary trade remedy laws (Blinch
1986).
The United States’ bargaining group has not as yet set down a formal
lis t of guarantees that it w ill require before it agrees to hammer out a
free trade package w ith Canada. But you can be sure that an end to
Canadian lumber subsidies is at the top of the list. As well, Congress
w ill never relinquish its power to levy countervailing duties on
imports deemed to be unfairly subsidized (Tower, September 1986).
The free trade talks between Canada and the United States seem to be
on hold now, waiting fo r December 30,1986 when the final judgment
w ill be passed on whether or not a 15 percent Import ta r iff should be
placed on Canadian softwood lumber imports. Canadian o fficia ls
previously had warned that punitive measures against Canadian lumber
could Jeopardize delicate negotiations on a free trade pact intended to
eliminate most trading barriers between the two nations (AP, October
17, 1986). Whether Canada and the United States continue th eir free
trade talks w ill not be decided until January of 1987. If the trade
talks are continued, they w ill have to be done quickly as Congressional
authority for the negotiations expires at the beginning of 1988. Any
deal would have to be presented to Congress by the fa ll of 1987
because the law gives U.S. legislators 60 working days to examine it
(Shepherd, 1986).
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Canadian Versus U.S. Arguements on the Need forTrade
Restrictions on Canadian Softwood Lumber Imports
This section w ill provide the arguments of U.S. Congressional
supporters of trade restrictions w ith Canada and the opposing
arguments of Canadian o ffic ia ls defending their country's trade
practices. Each set of arguments w ill be followed by a comments
section which w ill try to c la rify the different issues.
The Level of Canadian Imports to the United States
Point; Canada has substantially increased its export level of softwood
lumber to the United States
According to the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, softwood lumber
production in Canada has increased by 10 b illion board feet between
1975 and 1984, an increase of 103 percent. During the same period,
U.S. production of softwood lumber increased by 20 percent. The
Canadian lumber industry has also increased its share of the U.S.
lumber market. From 1975 to 1984, Canadian softwood lumber exports
to the United States rose by more than 7 b illion board feet. In 1975,
Canada held a 19 percent share of the U.S. softwood lumber market
while in 1984, Canada's market share was 33 percent.
Counterpoint: Canada has only modestly increased its export level of
softwood lumber to the United States
The Canadian government stresses that production of softwood lumber
in Canada has not increased substantially between 1978 and 1984. In
1978 Canadian lumber exports were 11.4 b illio n board feet while in
1984 they were 13.2 b illio n board feet, an increase of only 16 percent.
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Canadian o ffic ia ls feel that the United States Is distorting the
analysis of the Increasing market share enjoyed by Canada. They argue
that using 1975 s ta tis tic s Is misleading as It was a year of low
Canadian production due to a long strike In the lumber Industry in
Western Canada. By using 1978 sta tistics, Canada’s Increase in
market share In the U.S. Is not substantial. Between 1978 and 1984,
Canada’s share of the U.S. market increased from 28 percent to 31
percent, a grand total of 3 percent.
Comment:
Both Canada and the United States agree that the information used to
analyze the increase in Canadian softwood lumber is for the most part
correct. However, the discrepency arises over which Information is
pertinent and what time period should be used to observe trends. In
their 1985 report on Canadian softwood lumber imports, the ITC used
1977-1984 to calculate s ta tis tic s and observe trends, and s till found
that Canadian softwood lumber imports injured U.S. producers.
The Effects of Canadian Softwood Lumber Imports on the U.S.
Lumber industry
Point: Canadian lumber Imports have hurt the U.S. lumber industry
Over the past five years, demand for lumber In the United States has
Increased yet prices and p ro fita b ility have declined. Over 600 m ills
have been closed In the United States In the last eight years, meaning
the loss of thousands of jobs. The Injury is also apparent In the
growing trade Imbalance (Imports outweigh exports) between the
United States and Canada. Senator Max Baucus (D.,Montana) made the
following points in a Senate committee testimony:
( 1) Since 1980, the Industry has gone from a $400 m illion trade
surplus to a $2 b illion trade deficit.
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(2) Although softwood lumber consumption reached an a ll-tim e
high level of 43 b illio n board feet in 1984, U.S. sawm ills are
operating at only 83 percent of capacity.
(3) Since 1978, 250 sawm ills have closed and 30 000 U.S. lumber
industry workers have lost their jobs (Maly, DalSaglio, and
McKinsey, 1986).
In July 1985, the Chairman of the U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Import
reported to the ITC that if Canadian lumber imports continue to flood
into the United States, the resulting decline of the return on capital
w ill prevent continued investments in the U.S. softwood lumber
industry. The U.S. Department of Agriculture requested the Idaho
Forest Industry Council to compile information on the cost of
manufacturing softwood lumber. The Council provided a graph entitled
Lumber Cost-Price Squeeze, shown in Figure 9. Since 1980, the
average selling value of lumber in the United States has dipped and
remains below the average costs fo r manufacturing, logging and
stumpage. The Council concludes that the reason for the decline can be
based partially on increasing manufacturing costs and the current
depressed price for lumber due to the greater supply of inexpensive
Canadian lumber (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
Counterpoint: The lumber industry is suffering in both Canada and the
United States
The Canadian lumber industry is suffering from the same problems as
the U.S. industry. M ill closures, job losses and low p ro fit margins are
all visible in Canada’s lumber industry. Nationwide, the lumber
industry accounts for one in every ten jobs in Canada, therefore having
a great impact on the country’s economy. During the recession of the
early I980’s, employment in the Canadian lumber industry dropped
between 30 and 40 percent below the normal level. High levels of debt
at high interest rates have combined to ravage corporate balance
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sheets. Capital expenditures fo r 1983 were estimated at $1.4 billion
for the forest industry, about half the annual level of the 1980-82
period. In short, what started out as a severe cyclical downturn has
had longer-term effects w ith severe structural implications for the
Canadian industry (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
Comment:
The United States government and the U.S. lumber industry are blaming
Canadian lumber imports for the decline in prices, p ro fita b ility and
jobs prevalent in the U.S. industry. Canada's argument is that their
industry is suffering too and that other possible reasons for the
decline, such as structural changes in the industry and domestic
economic conditions , should be investigated (Maly, DalSaglio and
McKinsey, 1986).
Exchange Rates
Point: Exchange rate increases do not account for the total increase in
Canadian lumber imports into the United States
Since 1976, the value of the U.S. dollar in comparison to the value of
the Canadian dollar has risen from below par ($ 1.00) to approximately
$ 1.40 Canadian ( 1986). American government o ffic ia ls do agree that
the strong U.S. dollar is p artially responsible for the increase in
Canadian lumber exports to the United States. Senator Max baucus said
The overvalued dollar contributes significantly to the problem by
making imports cheap and exports expensive. But U.S. o fficia ls want
to make sure that subsidies by the Canadian government are not over
looked, They feel that these subsidies have as much effect on the
lumber trade imbalance as exchange rates do.
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Counterpoint: There Is a direct correlation between the increase In
Canadian lumber exports to the United States and the
value of the U.S. dollar.
Canadian o ffic ia ls state that the strong value of the U.S. dollar which
stands at approximately $ 1.40 Canadian is the major cause of the price
advantage Canadian lumber producers are currently enjoying. To prove
this point, one only has to look at the relationship over the last
several years between the Canadian share of the U.S. market and the
value of the U.S. dollar, shown In Figure 10. Even some American
o fficia ls agree that there is a direct correlation between increases in
Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. and the value of the U.S. dollar.
Congressman James Weaver stated, currently the most significant
influence on Canadian lumber imports to the U.S. is the exchange rate,
Morris Udall in a 1984 report to the House Committee on Interior and
Insular A ffa irs said, The single most important factor affecting
lumber imports Into the United States at the present time is the
exchange rate.
Comment:
While the two governments disagree on the perspective of this point,
evidence has been given to substantiate Canada's claim that exchange
rates have a substantial e ffe ct on the lumber trade between Canada
and the United States. The value of the Canadian dollar cannot,
however, fu lly explain Canada's cost advantages. It is the opportunity
to sell In the American market that gives the Canadian lumber industry
Its advantage over the U.S. 1ndustry-as a direct result of the dollar
disparity (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
In the ITC’s 1985 report, it was estimated that the difference in real
(versus inflated) dollars between Canada and the United States gave
Canada an 11 percent exchange rate advantage. Thus any Canadian firm
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that can pay for raw materials and other production costs in Canadian
dollars and turn around and sell the finished product in American
dollars, is going to have an advantage over a U.S. competitor.
Contrary to uniformed opinion, the exchange rate differential is
largely the result of high public d eficits and interest rates rather than
a consequence of deliberate Canadian policy to keep their dollar value
low. The two national currencies are closely tied and Canadian
producers have suffered the same impacts of overvaluation as their
U.S. competitors (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
The Effect of Different Approaches to Stumpage
Point: Canadian stumpage prices constitute a subsidy to the Canadian
lumber industry
A large number of U.S. government o ffic ia ls feel that the price the
Canadian government charges fo r stumpage constitutes a subsidy to
the Canadian lumber Industry. U.S. o ffic ia ls argue that Canadian
stumpage fees do not represent fa ir market value of the standing
timber and that these undervalued stumpage fees are causing unfair
competition. According to Senator Max Baucus, the U.S. industry has
been inundated by Canadian imports that benefit from massive
government subsidies, in the past, the U.S. Coalition fo r Fair Lumber
Imports has used the issue of low Canadian stumpage prices to
petition the ITC to rule if countervailing duties should be placed on
Canadian lumber imports.
Counterpoint: Stumpage by its e lf does not account fo r all the costs of
harvesting timber
Canadian o ffic ia ls feel that the emphasis placed on stumpage fees, and
the cost difference between Canada and the United States, is exag
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gerated. When all the costs of timber management are considered
(stumpage, reforestation, road building, cuttung, hauling and taxes) the
Canadian softwood lumber industry does not have a notable cost
advantage over the US, softwood lumber industry. The main reason for
this is that in Canada the company that buys the rights to cut Crown
Land also endures the cost for road building and reforestation. In the
United States these jobs are done by the U.S. Forest Service.
Comment;
Canadian firm s can sell lumber cheaper than American firms. Everyone
agrees w ith this fact, but there is disagreement when it comes to the
reason why. U.S. o ffic ia ls stress that stumpage prices constitute a
subsidy. But neither country can agree on the Importance of such
things as efficiency, productivity, transportation costs and forest
management policies. A recent study by the International Wood
workers of America (IWA), a union representing about 100 000
workers on both sides of the border, shows that Canadian m ill workers
on an average produce about 65 percent more lumber than their U.S.
counterparts (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). The IWA report
shows that the difference in productivity Is due to state of the art
technology and equipment and economies of scale at the larger
Canadian mills.
In the 1982 report by the ITC, It concluded that Canadian stumpage
fees did not give the Canadian lumber industry an advantage over the
U.S. lumber Industry because the delivered price of logs to the m ill
were comparable. The 1985 ITC report changed that decision. It
reversed the estimates of the logs delivered to the m ill and found the
average U.S. price to be $205 while the average Canadian price was
$166. This means that despite more d iffic u lt terrain, longer hauls and
sparser timber stands, Canadian m ills delivered prices of logs Is
cheaper. Therefore, It can be assumed that lower stumpage prices
allow the Canadian lumber Industry to undersell the U.S. lumber
industry.
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Canadian Market Penetration
Point: The Canadian governments change the market price of lumber to
maintain production and jobs
The Canadian government has a practice of offering low stumpage fees
to Canadian lumber firm s to help keep m ills open and stop
unemployment in the lumber industry. Because of this, Canadian
production has been able to increase over the period 1977-84 and
penetrate the U.S. lumber market to a greater extent. U.S. o fficia ls
have referred to this practice as a "welfare system" and a major
reason for revised trade legislation.
Counterpoint; Canadian government policy remains the same between
1977 and 1984
Canada has not changed any of its ploicies dealing w ith the lumber
industry between 1977 and 1984, therefore, the increased U.S. market
penetration of Canadian lumber must be attributed to some other
cause. In the past, the Canadian share of the U.S. market has
correlated w ith housing starts in the United States. The increase in
market share of Canadian lumber reflects an increase in U.S. housing
starts. When in 1981-82 U.S. housing starts fe ll o ff, so did the
Canadian market share of the U.S. lumber market. Other factors to
consider are exchange rates, efficiency of Canadian m ills and
increased demand for Canadian lumber products in areas other than the
new home construction market (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986),
Comment:
Low stumpage fees in Canada and an overall low price for lumber have
caused an Increased demand fo r Canadian lumber in the United States.
While Canadian stumpage remains at a consistently low level,
American producers are forced to pay fa ir market value for timber
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rights. This difference allows Canadian producers to sell lumber
cheaper than American producers can, thus causing Increased
purchases of Canadian lumber in the United States. It is true that
Canada has not changed its policy on stumpage between 1977 and 1984
but Canadian stumpage prices may have been too low to begin with.

Forest Management Policies
Point; Canadian forest management policies are inconsistent w ith a
policy of sustainable yield
U.S. o ffic ia ls are upset because the Canadian stumpage system does
not follow the same rules as the U.S. stumpage system. The U.S. feels
that Canada's policy does not guarantee reforestation. By doing so,
Canada is essentially "mining" its timber resources to the ultim ate
detriment of its forest products industry (Maly, DalSaglio and
McKinsey, 1986),
Canadian stumpage fees are lower than U.S. fees because the Canadian
system sees trees for harvest only whereas the U.S. system puts
timber in competition w ith other uses, therefore causing a higher
stumpage fee In the U.S. There are feelings on both sides of the border
that continuation of Canada’s present stumpage system w ill lead to
the ruin of its forest products Industry. Continuation of present levels
of regeneration, stand improvement and resource protection w ill
precipitate a decline from current levels of wood production (Canadian
Pulp and Paper Association, 1985).
Counterpoint: Canadian forest management policies are consistent
w ith a policy of sustainable yield
The Canadian viewpoint is that its forest management policies do
constitute a reasonable harvest/reforestation rate to guarantee a
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sustained yield, Their view is that lower stumpage fees are
reasonable on land containing sparse, low quality timber or on land in
remote areas (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986), Since much of
Canada's forestland fa lls into this category, stumpage fees are
reasonable.
Canada follow s a forest management policy consistent w ith its
resource base and should not be governed by conditions In the United
States. In fact, Canada has more productive forestland (544 m illion
acres) than the U.S. has commercial forestland(482 m illion acres).
Along w ith this, Canada has 550 b illio n cubic feet of softwood
inventory while the US, maintains only 456 b illion cubic feet (Maly,
DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986). This means that Canada can afford to
have a higher rate of harvest than the United States, yet presently, it
only harvests about 68 percent as much timber as the United States
(21 billion board feet as compared to 31 billion board feet).
Comment:
Although canada harvests more timber stands than the U.S. does, it
must be remembered that Canada can afford to do so as its domestic
requirements are only 10 percent the size of domestic needs In the
United States. If sustained yield is a policy meant to insure adequate
timber supplies indefinitely, then Canada is in a far better position
than the United States to risk overharvest. The United States, In the
long run, has a far greater problem of guaranteeing a sustainable yield
for domestic purposes (Maly, DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986). Canada
has less reason to adopt the U.S. philosophy on forest management
because of its large size and small population. Canada is concerned
about forest management but it should not be bound by U.S. standards
reflecting greater population density and less remote resources (Maly,
DalSaglio, and McKinsey, 1986).
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Loophole in U.S. Trade Laws
Point: A loophole in the U.S. trade laws allows subsidized Canadian
lumber to enter the United States
The 1982 ITC report found that Canadian stumpage practices gave
Canadian producers an advantage over their U.S. counterparts.
However, the U.S. Commerce Department rejected the petition for a
countervail action because the advantage enjoyed by the Canadian
softwood lumber Industry was available throughout the Canadian
economy to a broad array of wood products firms. Because of this,
S. 1292, Natural Resource Subsidies was proposed. S. 1292 would
ammend U.S. countervailing duty law to clearly establish that a
subsidy exists when a government, acting through a controlled or
regulated entity, sells an Input product or sells or grants the right to
remove or extract an Input product to domestic industries at a price
that is below market value for such inputs or removal rights (Senator
Baucus’ Office, 1986).
Counterpoint: Canadian stumpage rates are the same for both foreign
and Canadian producers and for both foreign and Canadian
markets
Even though provincial stumpage rates are low in comparrison to those
in the United States they cannot be regarded as a subsidy under U.S.
law because they are ‘generally available' in Canada to domestic
producers and exporters alike; there is no tw o -tie r’ pricing structure
that leads to export dumping’ and U.S. companies avail themselves of
the same stumpage rates as Canadian companies. O fficial studies in
the United States have confirmed that stumpage practices do not
confer a subsidy on the export of softwood lumber (Maly, DalSaglio,
and McKinsey, 1986).
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Canada's o ffic ia l reaction to 5,1292 is that since the U S, c ritic s could
not find an unlawful subsidy in the Canadian softwood lumber industry,
they would change the law so that any difference that makes a foreign
product more competitive is unlawful. The effect of the b ill is to put
everything in terms of U.S. standards. This is unrealistic when you
consider that not every country has the same standard of living,
resource base and environmental goals as the United States. Canada
believes that S. 1292 would place at risk all international trade,
including that of the U.S., and that it is a substantial departure from
international rule and practice and sets up a fa ir market value
benchmark for input products which is impossible to measure w ith any
objectivity (Diplomatic note 320).
Comment;
A 1985 study by the Congressional Budget Office shows the possible
effects of ammending the U.S. countervailing duty law. S. 1292 would
broaden the lis t of foreign government policies that are subject to
countervailing duties to include the use of natural resources inputs at
less than free market prices. The study also agrees w ith Canada's
position that S. 1292 could hurt international trade. Using U.S. prices
to determine the fa ir market value of natural resources would present
several problems, Generally the U.S. enjoys different productive
capabilities than other countries and has different patterns of supply
and demand. Using U.S. prices would negate these very substantial
differences and could lead to misa!location of resources to the
detriment of both U.S. consumers and foreign nations.
Fair Lumber Markets
Point: U.S. lumber producers are being driven out of their own market
by cheap Canadian imports
Between 1975 and 1985, Canada's share of the U.S. lumber market
grew from approximately 19 percent to over 33 percent, as seen in
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Figure 11. Because of this increase, domestic production has
decreased in the U.S. Thus U.S. producers are being driven out of their
own market.
FIGURE 11
REGIONAL MARKET SHARE OF
U.S. LUMBER CONSUMPTION

NM «I 9 .4 K

1975

1985 (9 mo#.)

Counterpoint: Canadian lumber imports complement the U.S. market
Canada should not be compared w ith countries who "dump" products
into U.S. markets. In the past, Canada has been a w illin g supplier of
lumber products to the United States, responding to formal government
requests to maintain or increase lumber exports to help maintain the
growth in the U.S. housing market. It is not appropriate for the United
States to undermine Canada's lumber industry which is specially
scaled to respond to U.S. needs (Maly, DalSaglio and McKinsey, 1986).
Comment:
Canada's lumber industry is geared for large levels of exports to the
United States, mainly because in the past the U.S. has formally

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

requested that Canada increase its lumber exports to the U.S. It is
d iffic u lt to ask a country to decrease its exports when it has been
constantly asked to increase its exports in the past.

implications of Free Trade Decisions on the Canadian and U.S.
Lumber Industries

This section w ill discuss the possible effects on the Canadian and U.S.
lumber industries if a free trade agreement is signed between Canada
and the United States. It w ill also discuss the possible outcomes
should free trade talks fa il and trade restrictions be imposed.
If free trade is achieved between Canada and the United States, it w ill
mean an end to duties and ta riffs and nontariff barriers that are now
in place to protect domestic industries in both countries. Free trade
w ill mean that any product made in North America (Canada or the
United States) could be sold anywhere w ithin North America at the
price the selling firm deems competitive. For example, a lumber firm
in Alberta could sell its lumber to a housing contractor in Miami at the
price it would sell it to a housing contractor in Calgary. No duties or
ta riffs would be placed on the lumber.
Assuming free trade negotiations are successful, there w ill be an
increase in the variety of products available. The types of trees grown
in Canada and the United States d iffe r in species and, due to the colder
climate in Canada, they also d iffe r in strength (Northern trees tend to
have tighter rings which tend to make them stronger). In other words,
Canadian lumber products are different than those found in the United
States. Free trade would allow products not normally found in a
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region to become available In that market. This would help the lumber
industries In both countries as they could supply the needs of both
Canada and the U.S., and it would benefit consumers as It would
Increase the variety of products to choose from,
With Increased trade comes increased efficiency in manufacturing. In
order to remain competitive, firm s on both sides of the border w ill
have to increase their efficiency and in turn lower their prices to
meet competition. Because new equipment would be required to meet
new efficiency standards, the Canadian lumber industry would
probably be in a more advantageous position than the U.S. lumber
industry because over the past ten years Canadian firm s have replaced
old equipment w ith modern, more e fficie n t, equipment while U.S. firm s
have continued to use the same equipment. The increased competition
would lower lumber prices to both Canadian and U.S. consumers.
Because of the competitive nature that a free trade agreement
between Canada and the United States would produce, more e fficient
means of lumber production would have to be used. To make the
lumber industry more e fficien t, new machinery would have to be used
and lumber companies would have to reduce their costs to remain price
competitive. Increased efficiency tends to coincide w ith decreased
employment As machines take over the jobs of many unskilled
laborers, companies w ill have to le t workers go. A recent report by
MTN News stated that the loss of jobs In Montana alone could reach
into the thousands and that unemployed workers would probably seek
jobs in the secondary lumber market. Both the Canadian and U S.
lumber industries see a decrease in employment if a free trade
agreement Is signed between the two nations.
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Under the present system, the United States exports almost no lumber
products to Canada. Some Maine logs head fo r eastern Canada but the
wood products generally return to the United States (Maly, DalSagllo,
and McKlnsey, 1986). Free trade would allow U.S. lumber firm s to sell
their products in Canada without restrictions and allow Canadian
consumers to take advantage of the different types of lumber
available. The U.S. lumber industry could increase its non-domestic
sales. There is also the possibility of the two industries joining
forces to penetrate markets in other countries, thus opening third
country market opportunities.
Free trade tends to lower prices because industries become more
efficient, in Canada and the United States, the largest consumer of
lumber products is the housing industry. As prices decrease, due to
free trade, savings can be passed on to homeowners. The decreased
cost of house building w ill encourage more people to build homes.
While this fact w ill help the housing industries in both countries, it
w ill also help the lumber industries in both countries as there is a
direct correlation between housing starts and the amount of lumber
sold. Costs to other users of wood products such as furniture makers
w ill also go down. The benefits w ill be fe lt throughout the economy.
Maintaining long term supply is a concern in the United States where
lumber demand is high and resources are slowly depleting. By allowing
another country (in this case Canada) to provide cheap lumber
resources, the United States would be able to conserve its lumber
resources for higher value uses such as recreation or future
consumption. Canada has large areas of productive resources (larger
than those in the United States) yet its domestic demand is only
one-tenth the size of U.S. domestic demand.
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Free trade would reduce regulatory costs as no agencies would be
required to stop or place ta riffs on imports from Canada Into the
United States or vice versa. Presently some states and provinces do
Impose bans on certain types of lumber. This process would be
eliminated under a free trade agreement between the two nations.

Assuming free trade talks fa ll and trade restrictions are Imposed,
costs to manufacturers are bound to Increase. U.S. lumber Is more
expensive than Canadian lumber, if the United States were to impose a
ta r iff on Canadian lumber to make It price competitive w ith U.S.
lumber, the Increased cost would be passed on to manufacturers who
presently use Canadian softwood lumber (mainly In the housing
Industry). This would mean Increased housing costs in the United
States which In turn would mean fewer housing starts. As mentioned
earlier, housing starts are directly correlated to the amount of lumber
sold. If housing starts decrease, so does the lumber market. By
placing restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports, the United
States could be cutting its own lumber Industry’s throat.
By restricting Canadian softwood lumber imports, the United States
w ill be forced to use domestic supplies of lumber to meet demand.
Today, Canadian lumber meets 33 percent of total U.S. needs or about
15 b illio n board feet of lumber per year. There Is some doubt as to
whether the U.S. lumber industry can maintain a sustained yield under
present conditions. Taking 15 b illion board feet of lumber a year out
of the reserves could destroy the future of the lumber Industry.
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As domestic supplies of lumber are decreased, the remaining timber
stands w ill become more valuable. Since timber stands are owned
predominently by private firm s in the United States, stumpage prices
are bound to rise. The effect of this w ill be that market prices of
lumber w ill rise. As market prices increase, cheaper products such as
plastics w ill be considered as alternatives for lumber, thus reducing
the demand for lumber and hurting the U.S. lumber Industry.
As more restrictions are placed on Canadian softwood lumber imports
to the United States, more agencies w ill have to be put in place to
assure that the restrictions are enforced. Additional customs
enforcement costs of $ 100 000-$ 150 000 per year have been
estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (Maly, DalSaglio and
McKlnsey, 1986). That figure Is for enforcement of the restrictions
alone, not for discussing or studying the restrictions which is paid out
of taxpayers money as well. Regulatory costs in the m illions of
dollars could be endured by the United States, if trade restrictions
were placed on Canadian softwood lumber.
The major concern of placing trade restrictions on Canada’s softwood
lumber imports is retaliation by the Canadian government. Some U.S.
o ffic ia ls feel that Canada w ill not retaliate. Senator John Melcher (D.,
Montana) said that Canada is taking advantage of Uncle Sam" and that
lumber restrictions like the recent 15 percent duty placed on Canadian
softwood lumber "w ill not spoil our relationship w ith them (Canada).
However, Canada has responded to the recent lumber ta riffs . Although
saying It was not a retaliatory measure, the Canadian government
Imposed a duty on U.S. corn exports to Canada in November 1986.
Placing trade restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports would
have a devastating effect on Canada's v ita lly important lumber
industry, and retaliation should be expected. If the United States were
to continue to place restrictions on Canadian lumber, more retaliatory
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re strictio n s would be inevitable on Canada’s part, The bad feelings
b u ilt up over a situation like this could have enormous effects on
diplomatic ties between the two nations as well. The cooperation,
communication and friendship that Canada and the United States have
enjoyed in the past would be damaged.
While there are no obvious answers to the problem of burgeoning
Canadian exports and corresponding market share reductions fo r some
domestic producers, a mutually beneficial alternative to protection
and retaliation is clearly what the two countries should pursue.
Government o ffic ia ls in both countries have suggested working more
closely together to expand and secure overseas markets for North
American forest products in general. This approach seems sensible in
light of the fact that both U.S. and Canada exporters suffer from the
penalty of overvalued currencies. Following through w ith this
approach would, however, require a much more cooperative attitude
than is presently visible and arrangements to preclude the issue of
’unfair" competition from spreading into new market areas (Maly,
DalSaglio, and McKlnsey, 1986),
Implications of a Canada-U.S. Accord For U.S. Trade With Other
T rading Partn e rs

Before the turn of the tw entieth century, over 80 percent of U.S.
exports went to European nations, w ith Great Britain as one of the
largest consumers of U.S. goods. Today only about 30 percent of U.S.
exports are sent to Europe. While European export markets have
decreased, Asian markets have increased. Between 1900 and 1985,
exports to Japan have increased from less than one percent to more
than 30 percent.
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Import percentages have changed as well. In the early twentieth
century, Europe accounted for over 50 percent of the Imports to the
United States. Asia on the other hand, has increased its imports to the
United States from 15 percent in the early 1900‘s to almost 35
percent today, making Japan the second largest exporter to the United
States next to Canada. 1980 s ta tis tic s show Japan exporting $30.8
b illio n of products to the United States and importing $20.8 b illion
from the United States. Great Britain exported $9.8 b illion to the
United States in 1980 and Imported $12.8 b illion from the United
States. Figure 12 shows the leading trade partners of the U.S. in 1980,
FIGURE 12

Leading Trading Partners of the United States 1980
Major Customers

$ Billions

Major Suppliers

S Billions

1. Canada

35.5

1. Canada

41.5

2. Japan

20.8

2. Japan

30.8

3. Mexico

15.2

3. Mexico

12.6

4. United Kingdom

12.8

4. Germany

11.7

5. Germany

11.1

•

5. United Kingdom

9.8
5.3

6. France

7.6

6

7. Italy

5.7

7. France

5.3

8. Venezuela

4.7

8. Italy

4.4

9. Brazil

4.4

9. Brazil

3.8

10. Australia
Source: Survey

4.2

Venezuela

10. South Africa

Current Business (November 1981), 18-20.
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A free trade agreement between Canada and the United states could
have definite effects on U.S. trade policies w ith other nations. Free
trade w ill cause increased trade a c tiv ity between Canada and the
United States. Canadian products that had previously been restricted
from entering the United States or that had duties placed on them w ill
now be available to American consumers. This could allow Canadian
firm s to steal market share away from other import countries like
Japan and Great Britain. Instead of buying technology from Japan, it
may now be cheaper to buy it from Canada. Britain could lose some of
the U.S. export market share if Canada were able to sell petroleum at
lower prices. With Canada already the U.S.'s largest trade partner, a
free trade deal between the two countries could open the door to
Canadaian firm s to a much greater extent. If th is were to happen,
export nations like Japan and Great Britain could be severely hurt by
the decreased U.S. export market share.
American firm s w ill become more e fficie n t under a free trade
agreement because they w ill be openly competing w ith Canadian firms.
This new efficiency level w ill cause prices to drop and possibly make
products, normally Imported from other countries, cheaper to produce
in the U.S. Consumers may choose to buy cheaper American goods
rather than import more expensive products. Therefore, U.S. trade
partners face a possible reduction in their U.S. export market because
of domestic U.S. domestic producers as well.
Finally, countries like Japan and Great Britain may be forced to
negotiate a free trade agreement of th eir own w ith the United States.
If Canada begins to take away their export markets, they w ill have to
do something to try to stop the decay. A free trade agreement sim ilar
to one that would be signed between Canada and the United States
could return the U.S.'s other trading partners to their former level of
importance. However, there is a negative side to countries like Japan
agreeing to free trade w ith the United States. Presently, Japan places
a large number of restrictions on trade w ith foreign countries. If
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Japan were to come to an agreement sim ilar to that being discussed
between Canada and the United States, it would have to remove most
of these barriers, Japan is an extremely protectionist nation and it is
possible that it would not want to remove the ta riffs it now has in
place. While Great Britain is not as protectionist in nature as Japan,
it too would have to agree to remove a number of trade restrictions in
a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. It is unknown whether Japan or
Great Britain would be w illin g to remove their present trade
restrictions on U.S. imports. If not, then a free trade arrangement
between the U.S. and Japan or the U.S. and Great Britain would be
unlikely.
If free trade fa lls between Canada and the United States, the door may
open for other U.S. trading partners to capture some of Canada’s export
market to the United States. If free trade Is not achieved it is likely
that trade restrictions w ill be put in place by the United States
government. These restrictions could cause hard feelings between the
two countries and cause retaliatory actions to be taken by Canada.
Once retaliation began, it could turn into a vicious cycle of ta riffs and
counter ta riffs to the detriment of both nations.
America's other trade partners w ill be anxiously awaiting the decision
or free trade between Canada and the United States. No matter what
the outcome, it is likely they w ill be affected.
Chap te r Summary

The demand for lumber in the United States is increasing. 1986 w ill
set a consumption record, fo r the third year in a row. The long term
demand projections of the 1970's are beginning to pan out. Yet, w ith
the increased consumption of wood products, producers' profits are not
at the level indicative of frantic economic a ctivity (NFPA, May, 1986).
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U.S. companies are operating w ith margins that are nowhere near the
levels enjoyed during the 1970‘s housing boom. Figure 13 compares
U.S. lumber consumption and lumber prices.
The cause of low prices and m ill closures is an abundance of domestic
supply coupled w ith increased Imports from Canada and continued high
production levels in U.S. m ills. Figure 14 shows Canadian market share
in the U.S., and Figure 15 compares Canadian lumber production to the
Canadian share of the U.S. market. Added to this is the fact that
stumpage charges in Canada (the price paid to the Canadian government
for use of Crown Land) are much lower than in the United States, as
shown in Figure 16, and therefore Canadian firm s have an advantage
over U.S. firms. Exchange rates are another factor in discovering the
reason fo r the low price of lumber in a boom period. If a Canadian
FIGURE 13
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firm sells lumber in the United States for $1 Canadian, the U.S.
consumer only pays $.70 U.S. because of the exchange rate. With the
low price of Canadian lumber along w ith a high value of the U.S. dollar,
Canadian lumber becomes cheaper than domestic lumber In the U.S.,
thus driving the overall price of lumber down and decreasing the p ro fit
margins of U.S. firm s. In turn, some m ills havebeen forced out of
business In the United States. Between 1977 and 1984, the U.S.
International Trade Commission has reported a net loss of 629 U.S.
softwood sawm ill and planing plants, an 18 percent drop. By contrast,
during the same period, Canadian sawm ills Increased by 85, a 9
percent increase (Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, January 20,
1986). Figure 17 shows the lumber producing establishments in
Canada and the U.S. from 1977 to 1984.
FIGURE 14
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FIGURE 17
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Because Canadian lumber Imports are so visibly damaging the U.S.
lumber Industry, it Is no wonder that the Canadian lumber Imports are
at the forefront of the free trade discussions between Canada and the
United States.
If free trade is achieved between the two nations, a number of
advantages and disadvantages w ill be realized by both lumber
Industries. New markets w ill be opened up, more e fficie n t plants w ill
be b u ilt, workforce requirements w ill be reduced and domestic
resources (especially In the United States) can be conserved. If free
trade Is not achieved, the U.S. Is likely to continue Its policy of trade
restrictions. This could harm the U.S. lumber Industry by causing a
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decrease in domestic supplies of lumber, increased stumpage fees and
the possible use of cheaper substitute products.
There are also implications for other trading partners of the United
States. They face the possibility of Canada capturing a portion of
th eir export market in the U.S.. Free trade w ill mean increased trade
a c tiv ity between Canada and the United States and products normally
imported to the U.S. from other nations may now be imported from
Canada.
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CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Free trade has become the center of attention in both Canada and the
United States over the past year. The two nations have expressed
th eir desires to reach a jo in t agreement on free trade. Several
preliminary sessions have been held between the two negotiating
teams, but no date has been set for formal talks to begin. The two
nations have until the fa ll of 1987 to reach an agreement (the deadline
was placed on U.S. President Ronald Reagan by the U.S. Congress). If no
agreement is reached by that time, the U.S. side w ill have to resubmit
its request to Congress to allow negotiations between Canada and the
United States to continue.
The main issue which is presently holding up the trade talks is lumber.
The U.S. accuses Canada of subsidizing its softwood lumber industry by
charging stumpage fees that are w ell below fa ir market value. This
action causes Canadian lumber to be less expensive and because of
this, exports from Canada to the U.S. have dramatically increased over
the last ten years.
In 1982, a U.S. ITC report stated that Canadian lumber exports to the
United States were causing an injury to the U.S. lumber industry. But
the U.S. Commerce Department decided that Canadian stumpage prices
did not constitute a subsidy to the Canadian lumber Industry.
Therefore no ta riffs could be placed on Canadian softwood lumber
imports. In 1985, the U.S. ITC reviewed their 1982 report and again
found that Canadian lumber exports were causing injury to the U.S.
lumber industry. This time, the U.S. Commerce Department found that
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Stumpage prices did constitute a subsidy and reversed Its earlier
decision.
The recent preliminary decision of October 16,1986 by the U.S.
Department of Commerce levied a 15 percent ta riff on Canadian
softwood lumber. The Department's final decision w ill be made on
December 30, 1986. The Canadian government and softwood lumber
industry deny that Canadian stumpage fees amount to a subsidy. They
argue that since these fees are offered to a variety of producers, both
Canadian and export, and that the price is the same whether the lumber
is fo r domestic or export use, that Canadian producers are not being
subsidized. Canadians also point out that exchange rates favoring the
U.S. and the efficiency of Canadian m ills also cause Canadian softwood
lumber prices to be lower than U.S. softwood lumber prices.
There are serious implications to consider if Canada and the United
States go ahead w ith free trade plans as well as serious implications
if the trade talks fa il. Free trade w ill bring an increased variety of
products and lower prices while decreasing the lumber industries
workforce. However, by buying cheap Canadian lumber, the United
States could conserve its own lumber supply and guarantee a
sustainable yield fo r the future. If trade talks between the two
countries fa il, it is likely that the United States w ill impose trade
restrictions on Canadian softwood lumber imports to the U.S..
Presently, Canada f ills about one-third of the U.S. domestic need.
Having to supply domestic lumber requirements could cause the U.S. to
fa ll below a level of sustainable yield needed to guarantee future
lumber supplys. Restrictions could also increase the price of lumber
which in the U.S. is directly correlated to stumpage fees. Therefore,
stumpage fees are likely to increase if restrictions are imposed. By
placing trade restrictions on Canadian lumber, the U.S. also leaves
its e lf open for retaliation. Canada's lumber industry is v ita lly
important to that country's economy and it is reasonable to believe
that Canada would retaliate in some form.
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Free trade appears to be the most beneficial path for both countries.
But unless an agreement can be reached on the lumber dispute, it is
like ly that trade restrictions w ill be put in place by U.S. officials.
The free trade issue has also implications for America's other trading
partners to consider. A free trade agreement w ith Canada could lessen
the amounts of exports the U.S. buys from countries other than Canada.
It could also force countries like Japan and Great Britain to negotiate
a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. themselves, Whether or not Japan
or Great B ritain would be w illin g to remove their present
protectionist ta riffs is unknown, but it is certain that neither country
would be able to reach a free trade agreement w ith the U.S. (sim ilar to
the one Canada and the U.S. are Discussing) unless they did remove the
m ajority of th eir ta riffs on foreign imports, if free trade is not
achieved and trade restrictions are imposed by the U.S. on Canada,
retaliation could occur. Potentially, the U.S.'s other trade partners
could gain any lost export market share in the U.S. that Canada might
experience.
Conç]y,.slon.s

In terms of the free trade talks between Canada and the United States,
several conclusions can be drawn from this paper. This section w ill
examine such conclusions.
Differences over the lumber dispute have caused the delay in free
trade negotiations. Both sides feel that lumber is an issue that must
be settled before any trade talks can begin. The United States has
accused Canada of subsidizing its lumber industry by charging low
stumpage fees on Crown Land. Canada argues that stumpage prices do
not cause a subsidy and that when all of the costs to harvest timber in
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Canada are considered (transportation costs, sparse timber areas) the
Canadian lumber industry does not have an advantageous position over
th eir U.S. counterparts. The recent findings of the U.S. Department of
Commerce disagree w ith Canada's position. The Commerce Department
found that Canadian stumpage prices did constitute a subsidy to
Canadian lumber firm s and it imposed a 15 percent duty on Canadian
softwood lumber imports to the U.S. The final decision on the duty
w ill be made on December 30, 1986. The outcome w ill have a great
impact on the future of free trade talks between Canada and the United
States.
When the U.S. accuses Canada of setting stumpage prices too low,
Canada is being judged by U.S. standards. Unfortunately, things are not
the same in Canada as they are in the United States. Canada is a much
more remote land w ith a colder climate, shorter growing season and
sparser timber stands. Therefore, the timber harvested by Canadian
producers is generally smaller than the timber harvested in the U.S.
Also, because timber stands are so sparse in Canada, fewer trees are
harvested from each timber stand in Canada than in the U.S.. Canadian
stumpage fees should be based on Canadian standards, not American.
This is the only way that an accurate assessment of Canada's
stumpage fees could be made.
Stumpage fees are not the only area where Canada is judged by
American standards. When U.S. o ffic ia ls talk about free trade w ith
Canada, they speak in terms of the U.S. way of thinking. They do not
seem to realize that other countries do not do things in the same
manner as the U.S. Senator Russell Long was quoted as saying I have
hope of getting the government of Canada to agree to trade rules that
are consistent w ith those we have learned to live w ith in the United
States.
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A free trade agreement w ill be beneficial to both Canada and the
United States. With free trade, the potential markets for Industries In
both nations increase. Canadian firm s have been waiting for the day
when they could compete for U.S. government contracts.

Free trade w ill allow these Canadian firm s to compete against U.S.
firm s for these contracts. The U.S. can benefit from a free trade
agreement w ith Canada because Canada has an abundance of natural
resources which the United States could use. Domestic requirements
for natural resources In the U.S. are enormous. The United States could
guarantee a sustained yield of natural resources by buying cheap
Canadian resources. A free trade agreement would benefit both Canada
and the United States.

Protectionist feelings are growing In the United States as can be seen
by the over 300 pieces of protectionist legislation now before the U.S.
Congress. If free trade talks fa il between Canada and the United
states, the U.S. is like ly to impose trade restrictions on Canada. The
main Issue holding up the trade talks presently is the export of
Canadian lumber. The U.S. has already placed an import ta riff on
Canadian Shakes and Shingles and has moved to place a ta r iff on
Canadian softwood lumber Imports. The U.S. trend in in placing ta riffs
on Canadian lumber is likely to continue.
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United States before the fa ll of 1987 (due to restrictions placed on
the U.S. bargaining team by the U.S. Congress). Presently, the
negotiations are stalemated over the issue of lumber. A number of
discussions have been held between the two nations on the lumber
issue but no agreement has been be reached. Because of this, the U.S.
Department of Commerce moved to impose a 15 percent ta r iff on
Canadian softwood lumber imports. The decision w ill not become final
until December 30, 1986 and Canada w ill not decide what actions to
take in response to the t a r iff until then. It is certain, however, that
the U.S. ta r if f w ill not be the end to the lumber dispute. Since both
sides have stated that free trade talks cannot begin until the lumber
issue is resolved, it seems unlikely that a free trade accord could
be reached by the fa ll '86 deadline. The present trade talks between
Canada and the United States are bound for failure. The only hope for
a free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. Is if settlement
can be reached on the lumber issue and then the U.S. Congress and
Canadian government agree to begin a new round of trade talks.
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